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,QWURGXFWLRQ
The Decomposition Approach, proposed by the economic theory, constitutes a trade balance adjustment 
process through exchange rate policy. According to this traditional approach, the influence of the foreign 
exchange policy on the price and volume of external trade is examined. The literature (Sadier, 1994, Sta-
matopoulos, 1999a)
1 may be divided into “Direct” and “Indirect” methods, depending on whether the ex-
change rate is included or not in the explanatory variables.  As regards to the “Indirect Method”, this may 
also be divided into “strong” methods, where the exchange rate doesn’t use it at all, in the right hand side 
variables (Goldstein and Khan, 1978; Herd, 1987) and into “weak” methods, where the competitors’ ex-
port price index is constructed via the exchange rate (Artus, 1974; Spencer, 1984).  As regards to the “Di-
rect” methodology, this also may be divided into “mix” methods, where the exchange rate is included into 
the explanatory variables (Kravis and Lipsey, 1977; Spitaller, 1980; Ahluwalia and al., 1975) and into 
“pure” methods where the exchange rate constitutes the sole right hand side variable (Robinson and al., 
1979; Krugman and Baldwin, 1987).  
 
Thus, in a partial equilibrium framework, we identify single equation models of the Hellenic Export Index 
Unit Value {[XY
￿}, using as explanatory variables the indices of the Hellenic unit labour cost {XOF
￿}, the 
competitors’ export unit value of Greece {[XYF
￿} and an external trade weighted effective index of the 
Greek drachma (GRD) {H
￿}. 
 
This theoretical selection can also be confirmed by the economic developments during the sample period 
1970-1995, which were mainly determined by Greece’s accession into the EEC as well as by its course in 
the European Monetary Integration, which in its turn, may be explained in terms of the “inconsistent 
triad” (fixed exchange rates, perfect capital mobility and monetary independence).     
Since January 1981, when Greece became a full member state of the EEC, its commercial transactions 
centralised gradually to the European markets with significant negative effects on its external trade deficit 
(Georgakopoulos, 1995). Thus, during the seventies the part of total Hellenic exports that went to EEC 
member states was 47%, whereas in the mid nineties this ratio increased to 66%, reducing correspond-
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1 Just for a survey.   2
ingly the previous export diversification. Therefore, that structural change justifies the use of an effective 
index of export unit value of Hellenic competitors
2 {[XYF
￿}, in its major export
3 destination European 
markets
4 (Stamatopoulos, 1999a).  
In addition, the increasing degree of openness of the Hellenic economy
5 gives additional reasons to use, in 
the Decomposition Approach framework, a nominal effective exchange rate of GRD {H
￿} as an explana-
tory variable in our models’ specification. More serious reasons which predict the significance of {H
￿} in 
explaining the variability of {[XY
￿} come from economic developments in EEC after Greece’s accession 
in 1981. Both the small size and the open Hellenic economy can explain why its monetary policy is de-
pendent on its European partners, and in addition, outside the reasons of its obligations due to the EMS 
(despite the fact that the GRD did not participate in the ERM, while it was part of the ECU). Thus, given 
the monetary policy co-ordination and the liberation of capital movements in Europe
6, under the requisi-
tion of the Unified European Act and Delors’ Report respectively, the exchange rate policy remained the 
only instrument, in terms of the “inconsistent triad”, for the Hellenic authorities to achieve their economic 
targets, i.e. the GDP’s growth promotion as well as the Trade Balance’s deterioration restrain (Apergis-
Soldatos, 1998).  
Furthermore, we also use in the right hand side variables, the Hellenic unit labour cost in manufacturing 
{XOF
￿}, as a good proxy of the exports’ production cost, given the fact that its light industry is labour intensive.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section two covers economic as well as econometric methodological 
issues, while in section three we present the time series used and their properties. Empirical results and 
comments on their significance are given in section four. Finally section five concludes the paper. 
 
0HWKRGRORJLFDO,VVXHV
We identify three linear models of export price equations based on the theoretical contributions of Kravis 
and Lipsey (1977) and Spitaller (1980) as regards the “Direct” method and Herd (1987) and Spencer 
(1984) as regards the “Indirect”. 
Using aggregate data with no distinction about the Greek export market destination, the following equa-









￿} denotes Hellenic index of export unit value at time W, {XOF
￿} is the Hellenic index of unit la-
bour cost for the manufacture at time t, {[XYF
￿} is an effective index of export unit value of Greece’s 
competitors at time t, weighted according to Spitaller (1980) taking into account both the markets destina-
tion of the Hellenic exports and our competitors’ share in them. Where 
￿ is an error term. 
Taking elements, from the “Indirect” e.g. Herd, 1987 and “Direct” e.g. Kravis and Lipsey, 1977 export 











￿ denotes an effective exchange rate index for the GRD at Hellenic major export markets destina-
tion, 
￿ is an error term. 
In the third equation the impact of the Central Bank’s exchange rate policy is taken into account indirectly 
through the Hellenic competitors’ export prices ([XYF












￿ is an error term. 
                                                 
2 Germany, Italy, France, UK, the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Spain, USA, Japan, Turkey. 
3 Germany (47%), Italy (25%), France (16%), UK (12%), see Section 3. 
4 These cover the 56% of total Hellenic exports, on the average, for the sample’s period (1970-95). 
5 During the 70s the average ratio of imports (exports) of goods and services to the GDP was approximately 17% (14%), while 
in mid-90s these rose to 33% (23%) (Leventakis, 1995). 
6 Starting from July 1990 in most country-members whereas May 1993 - May 1994 for Greece.   3
 
As regards the Econometric Methodology, first, we pre-test the variables for their order of integration. In 
order to avoid serious problems of misspecification (over or under-differencing) we apply several meth-




ing  and  assessing  models’  adequacy  for  each  of  the  two  sub-samples  (1970q1-1980q4  and  1981q1-
1995q4) indicated by Chow tests. Thirdly, we apply structural stability test (Chow test using dummy vari-
ables) in the co-integrating regression (1970q1-1995q4) of {[XY
￿}on {H
￿}. Finally, we use Engle-Granger 
(1987) co-integration technique for the specification of the appropriate Error Correction Model (ECM), 




The sample of quarterly data covers the period 1970q1-1995q4. The dependent variable is always the Hel-
lenic export unit value {[XY
￿}, which is obtained, from the database of IMF (IFS line l.74). As it is already 
mentioned, we assume as good proxy of the exporters’ production cost (Herd, 1987) in Greece, the index 
of unit labour cost in manufacturing {XOF
￿}, which is obtained from the database of OECD (MEI). In addi-
tion, like Spitaller (1980), we construct competitors’ weighted index of export unit value {[XYF
￿} using 
(Stamatopoulos, 1999a) as destination markets of Hellenic exports, the countries
7 Germany (47%), Italy 
(25%), France (16%) and UK (12%), while the shares of our competitors (Germany, Italy, France, UK, the 
Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, Spain, USA, Japan and Turkey) in these markets, were calculated 
from the database of OECD (International Trade by Commodity Statistics, ITCS). However, the ten indi-
ces of export unit value of Hellenic competitors were taken from the IMF’s database (IFS, l.74).  The 
nominal effective exchange rate of the GRD {H
￿}, is an external trade weighted index, which was com-
puted using, on the one hand, the Monthly Bulletin of the Bank of Greece’s database, for the nominal fix-
ing exchange rates of the GRD vis a vis the currencies of the countries
8, Germany, Italy, France, UK and 




￿} is used as the competitors’ index of export unit value in domestic cur-
rency. The year 1990 is referred as the base 1 of all indices. Lower case letters denote variables expressed 
in natural logarithms.   
 
Results from Dickey-Pantula (1987) multiple unit root tests and the Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo - 
H.E.G.Y.- (1990) seasonal unit root tests, are given in Table 1: Unit Root tests (1970q1-1995q4), Panels I 
and II respectively. The results confirm that there are no unit roots of higher order than 1, i.e. I(1) and that 
all of them are non-seasonal with deterministic seasonality. Because of the well known low power of a 
single DF or ADF-tests (e.g. Cambell and Perron, 1991), in Panel III of the same Table 1, we apply three 
different methodologies trying to gain additional confirmation about the existence or not of a unit root, 
that is, we search if the data generating processes (DGP) which gave us these sampling series are the Dif-
ference (DSP) or the Trend (TSP) Stationary Processes. Hence, from the application of Bhargava (1986), 
Dolado et al. (1990) and Phillips-Perron (1988) methodologies to our sample data series we concluded 
that only {[XY
￿} and {H
￿} came from DSP, i.e. are I(1), while {XOF
￿}, {[XYF
￿} and {[XYFGU
￿} came from 
TSP, i.e. are I(0).  
 
Because of these properties of the series, the first difference of the first two makes them stationary (of 
course, in the sense of the weak stationarity) while in the three remaining, we fitted trend models (Table 
2) to achieve stationarity.  






                                                 
7 In parentheses are the weights for the 56% of the average total Hellenic exports (1970-1995). 
8 Referring to Hellenic Exports’ destination markets plus the USD as “vehicle-currency”.   4
(PSLULFDO5HVXOWV
Before running the co-integrating regression (CR) of {[XY
￿} on {H
￿}, given the results from Table 1, we 















￿during the full sample period. Applying F-test for the 
H0: 
￿  
￿  , we found F(2,92) = 5,47 [0,0057], so it is strongly rejected. Thus, we should test for co-
integration dividing the sample in 1981q1, i.e. from Greece’s accession into the EEC. 
 
Table 3, gives reports of the two sub-periods, on the one hand, the long-run or co-integrating regression 
(CR) of the {[XY
￿} on {H
￿}, the OLS regression yields a “super-consistent” estimator of the co-integrating 
parameters   and   (Stock, 1987), and on the other hand, the Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) and 
Engle-Granger (EG) residual-based tests for co-integration. 
The results provide slight evidence in favour of CI(1,1) for the examined variables, in the second sub-
period.  
 
In Table 4 we present the short-run estimations or ECM, if there is co-integration which is confirmed by 
the  significance  of  the  residuals  (5
￿
￿
￿   from  CR  for  1970q1-1980q4  and  5
￿
￿
￿  from CR  for 1981q1-
1995q4), for the equations (1), (2) and (3). 
The long run join covariance of {[XY
￿}and {H




￿ } in both three equations, during second
9 sub-period (1981q1-1995q4), which 
gave us estimations of spherical error terms. This verifies that the Bank of Greece’s exchange rate policy 
supported the price competitiveness of domestic production in European destination exports’ markets. In 
exogenous shock the short-run deviation of {[XY
￿} and {H
￿} from their long-run equilibrium is covered by 
15% during the current quarter. However, when we add to the independent variables, the growth of ex-
change rate { H
￿}, the speed of short-run adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, is multiplied so that 75% 
of this distance is covered in the current period. An important empirical result is the significance of the 
restriction “the coefficients of the variables which are the major constraint of exporters, i.e. {XOF
￿} and 
{[XYF
￿} sum to unity”, for the period after Greece’s accession into the EEC (1981q1-‘95q4). In other 
words, given the support of the exchange rate policy of the Bank of Greece, it seems that the cumulative 








￿  £ -0,5), and on 










￿  £ 1,8)
10.  
 
Thus for the first equation, during the second sample’s sub-period, in which the Bank of Greece’s ex-
change policy is present via the stationary linear combination {5
￿
￿
￿ }, an 1% raise of {XOF
￿} seems to 
cause 0,8% reduction of {[XY
￿}’s growth rate, after a 3 months’ period, since {[XYF
￿} enables it to raise 
only 6-12 months later. That is, our data says that in a given raise of production cost, Greek exporters re-
duce their margins for 3-9 months until the competition in Europe enables them to re-establish them. 
However, from Equation 2, during the same sub-period, it’s remarkable that the short-run margins’ re-
striction is in fact zero, since the exporters exploited the GRD’s crawling peg, which enabled them to pass 
the rise of the {XOF
￿} onto the export prices, simultaneously.  Thus, 6 months later they increased their 
margins with the excuse of the rise in the competitors’ prices.   










￿   since 1981 vis a vis 70’s may be explained by structural changes in 
the Hellenic international commercial transactions (Hellenic trade pattern), during the sample period, as 
the weak demand that Greek exports faced in European markets (Giannitsis, 1994) and the abolition of 
governmental export subsidies from 1987 (Georgakopoulos, 1995), under the requisition of EEC’s direc-
tives.   
 
                                                 
9 The significance of first sub-period ECMechanism {5
￿
￿
￿ } is probably accidental given the residual-based tests for cointegra-



















￿   denotes growth export prices’ elasticity vis a vis unit labour cost (competitors’ export prices).   5
&RQFOXGLQJ5HPDUNV
In this paper we investigated the determinants of the Hellenic index of export unit value {[XY
￿}, during the 
period 1970-1995. Using three single equations’ log-linear models, in the Decomposition Approach’s to 
the Balance of Payment and in co-integration’s framework as well, we found the indices of the Hellenic 
unit labour cost {XOF
￿}, the competitors’ export unit value {[XYF
￿} and an external trade weighted effective 
exchange rate of Greek Drachma {H
￿}, as statistically significant explanatory variables. Greece’s accession 
to the EEC in 1981 splits our sample data set in two sub-periods 1970q1-1980q4 and 1980q1-1995q4. 
The Greek exporters’ diversification of their destination markets (Arabic as well as Ex-socialist and of 
course European), until 1980, gave them the possibility to implement discreet pricing policy, which in our 
empirical analysis appears through the abnormally high elasticity of the Hellenic export prices vis a vis its 























change rate regimes adopted by the Bank of Greece (1970-‘73 Bretton-Woods, 1973-‘75 US dollar peg) 
may  explain  why  we  did  not  find  the  dependent  {[XY
￿}  and  the  effective  exchange  rate  {H
￿}  as  co-
integrated this first sub-period 1970q1-1980q4.  
However, these crucial variables of our investigation proved co-integrated during 1981q1-1995q4. This 
fact could have the following economic interpretation, in the context of the inconsistent triad; the small 
size of the Hellenic economy, its degree of openness, and moreover its centralised commercial transac-
tions with the EEC, after 1981, could explain why it wasn’t necessary to co-ordinate through European 
Agreements (e.g. Unified Act for Common Market and Delors’s Committee report for European Union) 
since 1987, monetary policy to that of its Europeans partners, since the Hellenic one could not be inde-
pendent of them. The liberation of capital movements, which took place from July 1990 for most of the 
EU’s member-countries, was being applied gradually in Greece from May 1993 to May 1994. Therefore, 
the Bank of Greece had, until then, the possibility to use as a policy instrument the exchange rate to 
achieve at least the target of balance of trade restrain. 
 
During the same sub-period (1981q1-1995q4) the coefficients’ summation to unity restriction of the Hel-
lenic labour cost {XOF
￿} and the competitors’ prices {[XYF
￿} was also confirmed. This finding may explain 
the pricing policy of Greek exporters, who when faced with labour cost increases restrained either simul-
taneously or with a 3 months delay their margins to half or 80%, waiting to re-establish them either, 
within 3-6 months, to its respective price rise of their European competitors’ or simultaneously with the 
sliding GRD policy of the Bank of Greece. Here again, the discreet pricing policy of the Greek exporters 
was detected, as is seen by the high (even though moderated vis a vis the first sub-period) elasticities with 


























Finally, further research should be applied in order to gain additional confirmation about our conclusions 
however along new lines, first by using dis-aggregate data with micro-perspectives and secondly by taking 
into account the switch of the Bank of Greece’s exchange rate policy, at the end of 1987, which is empiri-
cally (e.g. Kirikos, 1998, Stamatopoulos, 2001) confirmed too.  
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Step 2 
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using normal distrib. 
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Where: The figures in parentheses of the first column indicate the critical values of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), for sig-
QLILFDQFHOHYHO  VDPSOHVL]H  , while numbers in brackets give the p-values. Sources: Fuller (1976), for statistics  , 
, WD1
*  WD ~
1   and Dickey-Fuller (1981), for statistics
" ,
# , 
$ . L : Number of lags in ADF tests. At Table 1 (L=4) 
except if marked otherwise. The choice was based on the criteria LM-test, or Ljung-Box Q-statistic (LB-test), or Akaike Infor-






Stepwise Regression (method= backward, slstay=0,05) 
XOF$





























Stepwise Regression (method= backward, slstay=0,05) 
XOF%
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{[XYF
%}1970q1-1980q4  
Stepwise Regression (method= backward, slstay=0,05) 
[XYF$






























Stepwise Regression (method= backward, slstay=0,05) 
[XYF%


























Stepwise Regression (method=backward, slstay=0,05) 
[XYFGU$










































Stepwise Regression (method= backward, slstay=0,05) 
[XYFGU%




















+ : quarterly seasonal dummy variables, such that the value of 6($6
+=1 in season t and zero otherwise. 7 : linear 
time trend. '
+ :  level dummy variable, such that '
+ =1 if  W ³ 1981q1 and 0 otherwise. '
+ :  level dummy variable, such 
that '
+ =1 if  W ³ 1987q4 and 0 otherwise. '
+ :  pulse dummy variable, such that '
+ =1 if  W = 1974q1 and 0 otherwise. 
'
+  :    level  dummy  variable,  such  that  '
+  =1  if    1988q4  £  W £  1991q4  and  0  otherwise.  %-BUHV :  is  an 

















, ). %-BUHV: is 
















, ). SEE : standard 
error of estimate. Q(t) : Ljung-Box Q-statistics for testing the autocorrelation of the residuals. Marginal significance level is 
given in brackets and t-statistics is given in parentheses. J-B(2) : is the Jarque-Bera statistic which under the null hypothesis of 
normality of residuals, is distributed 
2 with 2 degrees of freedom. HE : is an F-test for heteroskedasticity based on the regres-
sion of squared residuals on squared fitted values. ARCH(q) : estimated coefficient (and p-value in brackets) for the autoregres-
sif q term of the residuals’ conditional variance. 
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AEG & EG-
tests 
 = - 2,37 
[-3,8]
 = - 2,21 
[-3,37]
 - 2,22 
[-2,76]
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AEG & EG-
tests 
 = - 2,83 
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[-3,37]
 - 2,95* 
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Stepwise Regression (method= backward, slstay=0,05) 
[XY
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